Automatic License Plate Readers Are Expanding Across Stark County

Small solar powered cameras have appeared beside roads, at intersections and near entrances to communities across Ohio. Many of these devices are automated license plate readers, commonly called ALPR cameras.

Unlike a traditional surveillance camera that records continuous video, an ALPR system is designed to photograph passing vehicles, identify their license plates and convert the plate numbers into searchable information. The technology can help police locate stolen vehicles, identify vehicles associated with crimes and respond to alerts involving missing or endangered people.

It can also create a searchable record showing where vehicles were observed, even when the owners and drivers are not suspected of committing a crime. As ALPR networks expand, communities are being asked to consider both sides of the technology.

The cameras may provide police with useful investigative information. At the same time, the amount of information collected, how long it is stored and how widely it is shared can raise significant privacy and civil liberties concerns.

What has been confirmed in Stark County?

The North Canton Police Department was operating five Flock Safety automated license plate readers as of September 2025, according to information compiled from public records by the Atlas of Surveillance. According to Deflock.org, there are over 150 ALPR cameras in Stark County currently.

Canton has also considered a larger agreement involving public safety cameras and license plate readers. A Canton Board of Control agenda dated September 16, 2025, included an item calling for the city to enter into a renewable 12 month contract with Flock Group Inc., doing business as Flock Safety. The proposed contract amount was $167,399 and included public safety cameras, license plate readers, software, maintenance, support and storage. The proposed agreement was presented to the Board of Control on September 16, 2025.

Additional cameras resembling Flock equipment have been observed or reported around Stark County and nearby communities. However, the appearance of a camera does not establish who owns it, whether it is operating or whether it belongs to a police department, school, business, homeowners association or another private organization.

How does an ALPR camera work?

An ALPR camera captures an image of a vehicle and uses software to identify the license plate characters. The system may then compare the plate number with databases or lists containing vehicles of interest. The United States Department of Justice describes ALPR systems as technology that can capture plate images, convert the images into data, compare the information with databases and alert officers when a match is detected.

Depending on the company and system, an ALPR record may include the license plate number, a photograph of the vehicle, a photograph of the plate, the time and date of the observation, the location of the camera, the vehicle’s direction of travel, the vehicle’s make, model, color or body style and the presence of certain visible vehicle characteristics.

A camera alert does not automatically prove that the driver committed a crime. A plate could be misread, stolen, duplicated or attached to a different vehicle. The registered owner may also not be the person driving. For those reasons, an ALPR match should be verified by law enforcement before officers take action.

ALPR cameras are also different from speed cameras and red light cameras. An ALPR camera is primarily designed to identify and locate vehicles. It does not necessarily measure speed or automatically issue a traffic citation.

Flock Safety

Flock Safety is one of the most visible ALPR companies currently operating in the United States. The company’s legal name is Flock Group Inc. It provides cameras and related software to police departments, businesses, schools, neighborhoods and other organizations.

Flock systems can allow users to search for a specific plate or vehicle description. They can also alert officers when a vehicle matches a list of stolen vehicles or other vehicles entered into the system.

Flock states that its license plate readers collect vehicle information rather than facial recognition or biometric information. However, a plate number can still be connected to a registered owner through government databases available to authorized law enforcement personnel. Flock customers generally control who may access their information, how it may be shared and how long it is retained, subject to applicable law and contract terms.

How long does Flock store the information?

Flock states that the default retention period for license plate reader data is 30 days. After that period, the company says the information is permanently deleted from its cloud system unless a different retention period has been configured or the information has been preserved through another authorized process.

Flock’s published license plate reader policy states that data is deleted on a rolling 30 day basis by default. The policy also states that the retention period may be increased or decreased on an individual basis when a different schedule is required by a customer’s law or policy. This distinction is important. Thirty days is the company’s default period. It is not necessarily a maximum period required by Ohio law.

Does Ohio limit how long ALPR data may be stored?

As of July 2026, Ohio does not have a comprehensive statewide law establishing one maximum retention period for ALPR data maintained by law enforcement agencies.

Ohio law specifically excludes images and data captured by an automated license plate recognition system and maintained in a law enforcement database from the definition of a public record. That provision limits public access to the information, but it does not require the information to be deleted after 30 days or after any other specific period.

Because Ohio does not impose one uniform maximum period, an Ohio agency may potentially establish a period longer than Flock’s 30 day default if the longer period is permitted by the company, included in the agency’s contract and consistent with the agency’s policies and applicable records requirements. The actual retention period must be determined by reviewing the specific agency’s contract, written ALPR policy and records retention schedule.

Certain records may also be retained longer when they are preserved as evidence, exported from the Flock system or copied into an investigative case file or another records system. Those records could remain available beyond the ordinary Flock storage period, depending on the investigation, court requirements and the agency’s retention policies. The key concern is that Ohio law does not currently create one clear statewide deletion deadline that applies to every law enforcement ALPR database. A resident may therefore encounter different retention rules in different communities. One police department may use the 30 day default. Another could potentially use a shorter period. Another could adopt a longer period if supported by its policy, contract and records schedule.

Proposed Ohio legislation

Ohio House Bill 725 was introduced during the 136th General Assembly. The proposal would restrict certain collection, use, sale, transfer and sharing of information obtained through automated license plate recognition systems for commercial purposes.

The bill focuses on commercial use of ALPR information. It does not establish a comprehensive statewide retention period governing every police ALPR database. The proposal also should not be described as current law unless it is enacted and takes effect.

Other ALPR companies

Flock Safety is not the only company providing license plate reader technology.

Motorola Solutions owns Vigilant Solutions, a company that supplies license plate recognition technology and vehicle location information to law enforcement. Motorola acquired VaaS International Holdings in January 2019. The acquired companies included Vigilant Solutions for law enforcement customers and Digital Recognition Network for commercial customers.

Genetec produces an ALPR system known as AutoVu. The system can use fixed cameras or cameras mounted on vehicles. It is marketed for law enforcement, municipal parking enforcement and commercial use. Genetec states that AutoVu can help agencies identify wanted vehicles, locate vehicles connected with alerts and enforce parking restrictions.

Rekor Systems offers license plate and vehicle recognition products, including Rekor Scout. The company states that its software can recognize plates and vehicle characteristics using compatible traffic, security and internet connected cameras.

Different companies may use different equipment, search functions, retention periods and sharing arrangements. The rules governing one company’s system should not automatically be applied to another.

The benefits of ALPR technology

The clearest advantage of ALPR technology is speed. An officer watching traffic can observe only a limited number of vehicles. An automated system can scan many vehicles, compare the plates with lists and issue an alert within seconds.

Police may use ALPR information to locate stolen vehicles, find vehicles associated with missing or endangered people, identify a vehicle seen near a crime, develop leads from a partial plate number, determine whether a vehicle passed a particular camera, connect crimes committed in multiple jurisdictions, reconstruct portions of a vehicle’s route and locate vehicles connected with warrants or serious investigations. The Department of Justice has found that ALPR technology can expand law enforcement’s ability to collect relevant information and quickly compare license plates with lists of vehicles of interest.

The information may also provide investigators with a time and location that is more precise than a witness’s memory. For smaller police departments, a regional network can provide investigative coverage that would be difficult to reproduce with officers alone.

The limitations and concerns

The presence of an ALPR camera does not guarantee that crimes will be prevented or solved. Research published through the National Institute of Justice has noted that license plate readers have spread widely even though strong research evidence concerning their crime prevention effectiveness remains limited.

A system may generate useful leads, but it cannot determine who was driving a vehicle, why the vehicle was at a location or whether criminal activity occurred. Its effectiveness also depends on camera placement, image quality, accurate plate recognition, proper database information and officers correctly reviewing alerts.

Privacy concerns

A license plate is visible to the public. Police officers have always been able to observe and record a plate seen on a public road. The privacy concern changes when individual observations are collected automatically, stored and combined into a large searchable database. A person may pass one camera while traveling to work, another near a medical office, another near a church and another while attending a political event. One camera observation may reveal little. A large number of observations collected over time may reveal a pattern of movement.

The Congressional Research Service has reported that ALPR use raises questions involving privacy, civil liberties and the Fourth Amendment. Courts have generally found that observing a license plate in public does not by itself constitute a Fourth Amendment search. The more difficult legal question involves searching large databases that can show a vehicle’s movements over time.

According to the Congressional Research Service, no federal appellate court had issued a controlling decision resolving whether law enforcement searches of certain large ALPR databases constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Some courts have allowed such searches, while also warning that more extensive and prolonged tracking could eventually raise constitutional concerns.

Collection involving people not suspected of crimes

Most plates photographed by ALPR cameras belong to people who are not suspected of criminal activity. Their information is collected because they drove past a camera, not because a court found probable cause to monitor them.

Supporters argue that the data is limited to vehicles traveling in public and can provide valuable information during an investigation. Critics argue that collecting the location of every passing vehicle creates a form of broad surveillance in which information about innocent people is stored in case it becomes useful later.

Data sharing

Earlier generations of automated license plate readers were commonly mounted on police cruisers and connected to computers inside the vehicles. The systems read passing plates and compared them with locally loaded lists of stolen or wanted vehicles, alerting officers when a possible match occurred. Although some agencies retained or transferred plate records to centralized police databases, the technology did not always depend on a private company continuously storing every detection in a cloud system. Newer systems such as Flock use fixed internet connected cameras and privately operated cloud storage, allowing agencies to search historical vehicle sightings across a broader network. The concern among some people now is that your data is being stored by a private company instead of a law enforcement agency.

Another concern involves the sharing of information between agencies. An ALPR system may allow a local department to search only its own cameras. It may also permit access to information gathered by neighboring departments, state agencies, federal agencies or agencies in other states.

The exact sharing arrangement depends on the system, customer settings, contracts and agency policies. The United States Government Accountability Office reported that selected federal law enforcement agencies had agreements allowing access to information from third party ALPR systems, providing access to a nationwide source of license plate data. Regional sharing can help locate a stolen vehicle that crosses jurisdictional boundaries. It also means that information collected in one community may become searchable by an agency located far away.

Unauthorized searches and misuse

Any large database can be misused if access is not properly controlled. Possible risks include searches made for personal reasons, searches unrelated to an investigation and improper monitoring of individuals, organizations or events. Audit logs can record who searched the system and why. However, an audit generally identifies misuse after the search has already occurred. Strong policies may require each search to include a case number, reason or other documentation. Policies can also limit access to trained personnel and require regular supervisory reviews.

Incorrect alerts

License plate readers are not always correct. A plate can be misread because of glare, darkness, dirt, damage, weather, camera angle or similar looking letters and numbers.

The plate may also be connected with a stolen vehicle while being physically attached to a different vehicle. Officers should visually confirm the plate and vehicle before taking enforcement action. An ALPR alert should be considered an investigative lead, not automatic proof of guilt.

Expansion beyond the original purpose

A department may initially purchase cameras to locate stolen cars and missing people. The system may later be expanded to include more cameras, longer retention periods, broader sharing or new search and analysis features. Changes in technology and policy may occur without residents fully understanding how the system has changed. For this reason, public oversight should continue after the cameras are purchased. It should not be limited to the initial contract approval.

What local safeguards could include

A community can use ALPR technology while still placing restrictions on its use.

A strong local policy could include a clear list of permitted law enforcement uses, a defined retention period, automatic deletion of routine detections after that period and longer retention only for information connected with a documented investigation.

It could also require every search to include a legitimate reason, limit which employees can access the system, require regular review of user accounts and maintain audit logs showing who performed each search.

Other safeguards could include regular supervisory audits, penalties for unauthorized searches, human verification before a vehicle is stopped, rules governing access by federal and outside agencies and public disclosure of data sharing agreements.

Communities could also require public disclosure of the number and general location of cameras, contracts and annual costs. Agencies could publish annual reports showing searches, alerts, confirmed matches and misuse.

Additional safeguards could include a process for reporting security breaches, a requirement for council or public approval before major expansions and a clear process for deleting data that is no longer needed.

Transparency is central to the debate

The debate over license plate readers is not simply a choice between law enforcement and privacy. The technology can help investigators locate vehicles and respond quickly to serious incidents. The same technology can also create a broad record of where ordinary people travel. Both facts must be considered. The level of privacy risk depends on how many cameras are operating, how long information is kept, how many agencies can search it, what searches are permitted and whether violations are identified and punished.

For Stark County residents, the discussion should begin with information that can be verified. Residents should be able to learn how many cameras are operating, which public agencies own or use them, which companies provide the systems and what retention period each agency follows.

They should also know whether the default storage period can be extended, which outside agencies may search the data, whether privately owned cameras are sharing information with police, whether every search requires a documented reason, how often searches are audited and what happens when a user violates the policy.

Until those questions are answered publicly, residents cannot fully evaluate either the benefits or the risks of the expanding ALPR network.